By Mohammad Amin
After a series of back-to-back deadly skirmishes and bombings by Afghan and Pakistani forces for nearly two weeks in October, an uneasy ceasefire was put in place between the two countries on October 30.
Representatives of the two sides met in Istanbul where Turkish and Qatari officials acted as mediators and ceasefire guarantors. This was the first time in over a year that hostilities broke out between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where, in the backdrop of the American war-on-terror policy, Islamabad allied with US forces to hit the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network.
The war on terror officially ended when the last of the US forces pulled out of Afghanistan in August 2021, by which time the Taliban was back in the saddle in Kabul. Since then, an unlikely player, India, which was forced to shut down its Kabul embassy in 2021, has entered the Afghan field. Indian engagement began in 2022 when New Delhi adopted a humanitarian aid policy for the war ravaged country.
The reset in India’s ties with a new Afghanistan is a remarkable shift, especially in relation to the Taliban which was earlier viewed with hostility, given the outfit’s extreme Islamist ideology and its deep nexus with the Pakistani military establishment. Between 1996-2001, New Delhi backed the Northern Alliance led by the charismatic Ahmed Shah Masood.
At that time, India was firmly in support of the Western-backed government that took charge in the wake of the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban of the time carried out attacks against Indian nationals and bombed the Indian embassy and the consulate in Kabul and Herat in 2009 and 2014, respectively.
Clearly, India does not want Afghanistan to emerge as a terror playground that could pose a renewed threat to regional security, especially its own. This needs to be seen in the backdrop of the rupturing of Kabul-Islamabad ties. On its part, the Taliban-led government expects the Indian establishment to do more than provide humanitarian aid, undertake development projects and promote trade, regional connectivity and tourism. It wants India to pull it out of diplomatic isolation, especially at a time when it seeks regional and global legitimacy.
Cautious diplomacy
Over time, marked by some cautious diplomacy, India progressively deepened its ties with the new Taliban regime. This was unveiled recently, with the arrival in New Delhi of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mutaqqi in the second week of October, taking most international diplomatic circles by surprise.
On October 9, when Mutaqqi landed in Delhi, Pakistan jets hit Kabul by taking advantage of weak Afghan radar and air defence systems.
Five days later, Pakistan Foreign Minister Khwaja Asif, while conceding the Taliban as a creation of his country, did little to conceal that the ruling clerics in Kabul had turned “untrustworthy”. He also accused the Taliban of sheltering the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, an umbrella outfit of smaller armed groups inimical to Islamabad’s interests.
In response to the Pakistan airstrike, the Taliban retaliated swiftly two days later, reportedly killing 58 Pakistani soldiers. This was described as retaliatory measures by the Taliban government spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid who even cautioned the Pakistan security establishment of “negative consequences” in the event force was applied. This indicated that the security situation could potentially spiral out of control.
In a joint statement on October 10, the Afghan and Indian sides “unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism emanating from regional countries”, indicating that New Delhi’s warming up to Kabul was aimed primarily at isolating and targeting Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. This was acknowledged by Mutaqqi who reaffirmed his country’s “commitment” to “not allow any group or individual to use” its territory against India.
Mutaqqi’s visit was the perfect occasion for the Indian establishment to declare a slew of humanitarian aid and development projects in healthcare, public infrastructure and capacity-building, for Afghanistan.
An announcement regarding resumption of regular cargo flights between Kabul and New Delhi would not only enhance connectivity but also open the doors for trade and tourism. On his part, Mutaqqi invited Indian companies to invest in the country’s mining sector. Even sport, including cricket, found its place in this evolving relationship.
Mutaqqi’s visit was followed by that of Afghan Industry and Commerce Minister Alhaj Noorduddin Azizi, between November 19 and 25.
Soon after the Taliban took charge of Kabul in 2021, India advocated an “inclusive government”. Pakistan, Iran and China too have urged the Taliban to form a broad-based government that includes representatives of all ethnic and political groups that would ensure peace and stability.
Pakistani moves
The TTP’s attacks against the Pakistan military and Islamabad’s accusations against India for fueling tensions on its borders with Afghanistan have made the situation fraught and volatile.
The Pakistani airstrikes on Afghanistan were launched as part of a strategy to undermine and politically regulate the Taliban regime’s conduct of foreign relations, particularly with India.
Pakistan’s national security managers, especially the Army under General Asim Munir, attempted to cause a divide between the Afghan people and the Taliban as a strategic means to disrupt regional and international consensus the Taliban regime by branding the Kabul regime as a threat to local and global stability.
The Pakistani airstrikes were an attempt to send out a signal to the international community that it is now a victim of a proxy network, involving the Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, that aims to hurt its geopolitical interests in the region.
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been complex. This was as much true when the Islamic Emirate was established in 2021 as it was during the Afghan republic, the US-led war on terror when Pakistan was a Western ally and when America extended covert help to the mujahideen against the Soviets. Pakistan’s military approach now is part of its foreign policy which employs coercion as a leveraging instrument against neighbouring states.
Mutaqqi’s New Delhi visit was said to have been facilitated by the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee which accorded temporary exemption to a travel ban on some other Taliban leaders. This indicates that the international community, especially the West, may also be prepared to take small outreach steps.
The direction that regional geopolitics will take will depend on the role that the Pakistan military establishment takes in relation to the Taliban-led Afghanistan and how far India is committed to realigning its own security with that of the US.
Besides, what the Taliban seeks of India and what the latter can provide will be based on pragmatism. There are clear differences in democratic and social “values” between the Taliban regime and New Delhi, especially on the issue of women’s rights and freedoms. But India would look beyond, albeit cautiously, to focus on long-term realignment in the backdrop of emerging US-Pakistan reconciliation.
Mohammad Amin is a PhD scholar at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana. His research interests are in geopolitics and information warfare studies.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
