By Giulia Olini
When a great power speaks of “exercising sovereignty” over a territory inhabited by others, what is usually at stake is not the literal feasibility of the operation. More often, the political signal matters: the willingness to raise the threshold of what can be said and, precisely for that reason, made negotiable.
In this sense, the re-emergence in early January 2026 of assertive U.S. statements on Greenland should be read first as a political event, even before a strategic one. Not because Washington has suddenly “discovered” the island or the Arctic region – long central to American security strategy – but because the dossier has been reframed in the language of acquisition. That register places strain on two principles that the West, and NATO itself, tend to regard as non-negotiable: territorial integrity and the self-determination of peoples.
Over the past week, media reports have described advisers to President Donald Trump weighing options ranging from “soft” inducements to intermediate political arrangements, and – at least rhetorically – even more extreme instruments. Proposals have reportedly included direct economic incentives targeted at Greenland’s population, with figures amounting to tens of thousands of dollars per resident, alongside suggestions of a “free association” modelled on the Compacts of Free Association (COFA).
On the diplomatic front, Denmark has reacted firmly, backed by major European governments, with explicit warnings that coercion directed at an ally could create an irreparable rupture within NATO and weaken its cohesion. In Nuuk, the slogan “Not for sale” has resurfaced as an identity-based response even before an institutional one, shifting the narrative from realpolitik to the values underpinning the long-standing relationship between the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland and the United States.
2025: The escalation of a dossier
To understand how this situation developed, it is useful to trace developments over the past year. The first turning point came in January 2025, when, in the early days of his second term, Trump revived the Greenland dossier first raised in 2019. He described the island as “vital” to U.S. security and suggested Denmark should relinquish control.
Within days, global media amplified the remarks. On 27 January, Denmark announced a 14.6 billion kroner ($US 2.05 billion) package to strengthen its Arctic and North Atlantic military presence, including new Arctic naval vessels, additional long-range drones and enhanced satellite surveillance.
At the same time, Danish newspaper Berlingske and Greenlandic outlet Sermitsiaq commissioned a Verian poll. It showed that 85 percent of Greenlanders opposed becoming part of the United States, and many described Trump’s interest as a threat. The data highlighted a political constraint: the issue could not be reduced to an economic negotiation.
The pattern deepened through 2025. On 10 October, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands presented a second Arctic and North Atlantic defence agreement, worth 27.4 billion kroner, covering additional vessels, maritime patrol capabilities, a new Joint Arctic Command headquarters, drones and a North Atlantic submarine cable.
In December 2025, Trump reinforced the dossier’s prominence by appointing Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as special envoy for Greenland, further hardening relations with Copenhagen.
The narratives behind “sovereignty”
Since January 2025, Trump and several analysts have advanced varying rationales for “US sovereignty” over Greenland: security, strategic competition with Russia and China, and economic vulnerability linked to critical mineral supply chains.
From a security perspective, Greenland has been portrayed as indispensable for North Atlantic monitoring, especially as threats expand into missile and space domains. This framing is often paired with what might be described as geopolitical hyper-realism: the Arctic as the new frontier of global competition, with concerns that Moscow and Beijing could fill perceived vacuums along the northern arc and the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) gap. The economic argument, reinforced by developments in Venezuela, centres on Greenland’s subsoil resources and the importance of securing access to raw materials.
Individually, these rationales carry weight. The difficulty arises when sovereignty is presented as a prerequisite for obtaining those benefits. That leap conflates strategic importance with territorial control and overlooks existing instruments that already provide access and operational capacity.
Greenland is not the central front
First, the United States is already present on the island. Pituffik military base – formerly Thule – has long been embedded in US and NATO security architecture under the 1951 Defence Agreement between Denmark and the United States. US Space Force descriptions frame the base as a structural component of Arctic posture.
If the objective were operational enhancement and modernising capabilities, updating agreements would appear the rational course – not rather than politicising issues of jurisdiction or control..
Second, the Russia and China argument requires geographical precision. Arctic deterrence largely revolves around Northern Europe and Russia’s nuclear bastion in the Barents-Kola area, and access routes to the North Atlantic.
With respect to China, analysts note more consistent signalling in the Pacific Arctic and Alaska quadrant. This does not render Greenland irrelevant, but it challenges the idea that sovereignty transfer would meaningfully alter regional security.
Finally, there is a political paradox. A strategy intended to increase security may reduce it if it erodes trust within NATO. Deterrence relies not only on capabilities but on predictability and alliance cohesion. Language suggestive of annexation risks depleting political capital.
Rare earths and the limits of sovereignty
The resource argument warrants technical scrutiny. Mining in Greenland is governed by licences issued under the Mineral Resources Act by the Greenlandic Government. Prospecting and extraction depend on regulatory approval, not political control of territory.
Legal analyses indicate no rigid distinction between domestic and foreign actors in acquiring mineral rights. Even where a licence must be held by a Greenlandic company, this does not constrain the nationality of capital behind it.
Economic access can therefore be secured through corporate instruments, partnerships and regulatory compliance. Sovereignty is not a technical prerequisite. The bottleneck lies elsewhere. Mining projects must pass stringent filters: infrastructure, energy costs, logistics, environmental standards, administrative capacity and political sustainability. The Kvanefjeld/Kuannersuit case, linked to rare earths but also to the presence of uranium as a by-product, illustrates how domestic policy decisions can reshape feasibility.
If rapid and reliable access is the objective, territorial pressure risks increasing political uncertainty and raising project risk. The more relevant question is therefore not who “owns” Greenland, but who can construct a stable and legitimate access regime grounded in predictable rules and local consent.
Where the dossier stands
In recent weeks, rhetoric has softened slightly. The 14 January meeting in Washington confirmed sharp disagreement over sovereignty but established a channel to address Arctic security concerns.
A brief re-escalation followed with tariff threats directed at European allies. However, at Davos on 21 January, the issue returned to a negotiating frame better aligned with alliance constraints.
On 28 January, the United States, Denmark and Greenland launched diplomatic and technical talks addressing US priorities within Danish sovereignty red lines. NATO moved to reinforce Arctic deterrence planning, initiating preparations for the Arctic Sentry mission.
What now for Europe?
Europe’s response will depend less on rhetoric than on organisation. If “strategic autonomy” is to carry substance, it must translate into focused priorities and concrete instruments that reduce exposure to coercive leverage. That requires investment in infrastructure, redundancy in critical chokepoints and alignment between regulatory authority and material capacity.
The Greenland episode did not involve tanks or formal rupture. Yet it demonstrated how quickly alliance stability can be tested when leverage is applied at low cost.
For the European Union, Greenland is ultimately less an Arctic dispute than a governance challenge of interdependence. Whether it becomes a catalyst for institutional acceleration or another cycle of alarm and inertia will depend on how swiftly awareness is converted into capacity before the next strategic test emerges.
Giulia Olini is a first-year PhD candidate in Institutions and Politics at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. Her research interests lie in International Relations and geopolitics, with a particular focus on transatlantic dynamics. Her doctoral research examines the concept of weaponised interdependence in the evolving relationship between the United States and the European Union. She also conducts research on the Arctic region and has published The Arctic in Transition: How the Russo-Ukrainian War Challenged Exceptionalism and Reshaped Regional Governance and Security (Global Age, 1(1), 2025). Prior to beginning her doctoral studies, she worked for nearly three years as a Corporate Intelligence Analyst specialising in international security at Italy’s two leading banking institutions.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
