In a development that has quickly stirred controversy across Bangladesh’s political landscape, the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has signalled its willingness to support the creation of a humanitarian corridor between the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) and Myanmar’s embattled Rakhine State.
On April 27, Bangladesh’s Foreign Adviser, Md Touhid Hossain, confirmed Dhaka’s preliminary decision to allow the proposed corridor, citing humanitarian considerations amid the ongoing crisis affecting the Rohingya and ethnic communities in western Myanmar.
This revelation has sparked a firestorm of political opposition, with multiple parties raising alarm over what they see as a premature and risky manoeuvre.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in particular, has sounded a stark warning, branding the corridor initiative a direct threat to Bangladesh’s sovereignty and national security.
Party leaders claim that the interim government, which lacks an electoral mandate, is making a decision with long-term geopolitical implications without consulting the broader political spectrum or the public.
The proposed corridor—intended to facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid, medical assistance, and displaced persons between Bangladesh and Rakhine—comes at a time when the region is marred by intensifying conflict between Myanmar’s military junta and ethnic armed groups, particularly the Arakan Army.
Thousands have reportedly fled into bordering areas of Bangladesh in recent months, and the humanitarian crisis is deepening across Rakhine.
Yet, critics argue that any formal corridor could unintentionally normalise the influx of refugees and insurgents, strain local resources, and entangle Bangladesh further in Myanmar’s internal conflict.
For the BNP and its allies—including Islamist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam and Islami Andolan Bangladesh, as well as the Communist Party of Bangladesh—the corridor represents more than a foreign policy misstep; it is a potential constitutional overreach by a transitional administration.
“This interim government has no mandate to engage in decisions that affect our national security framework,” a senior BNP leader said. “We will build a broad alliance to oppose this move both in the public sphere and through legal channels.”
These fears are not entirely unfounded. The Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the corridor would originate, have long been a politically sensitive and militarised zone with a complex ethnic composition and a fragile peace process.
Any attempt to repurpose this region as a conduit for cross-border humanitarian traffic could reignite old tensions, destabilise interethnic relations, and invite new geopolitical entanglements.
Moreover, the corridor could inadvertently open the door for increased surveillance and influence by foreign powers operating under the guise of humanitarian assistance.
Regional observers have noted that such a corridor, especially one bordering China-backed Myanmar territories, could eventually be leveraged for strategic purposes, complicating Bangladesh’s traditional policy of non-alignment.
From a security perspective, intelligence officials have reportedly expressed concerns over the potential for weapons smuggling, trafficking of insurgents, and cross-border criminal activity.
The porous and forested terrain of the CHTs already presents challenges for law enforcement, and a designated corridor would add layers of complexity to border management.
Even within civil society, the response to the government’s announcement has been tepid at best and sceptical at worst.
While humanitarian principles resonate with Bangladesh’s historical role in providing refuge to the persecuted, including hosting over a million Rohingya refugees since 2017, public sentiment appears wary of another commitment that could spiral beyond Dhaka’s control.
The interim government’s rationale, according to Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain, is that Bangladesh cannot “stand idly by” while civilians suffer across the border.
The administration has reportedly held informal consultations with international humanitarian agencies and some Western diplomatic missions, which view the corridor as a potential model for regional cooperation in humanitarian crisis management.
However, such international endorsement does little to address the domestic pushback, which grows more intense by the day.
Adding to the controversy is the timing of the announcement.
Coming just months after the fall of the Awami League-led government, and at a moment when the political landscape is still realigning, the corridor decision has become a lightning rod for larger questions about the legitimacy, reach, and responsibilities of a transitional administration.
The BNP has already indicated plans to convene a national conference with like-minded parties to chart a unified response.
Protest rallies are also expected in the coming weeks, particularly in areas adjacent to the proposed corridor, where local populations fear displacement, militarisation, and erosion of cultural autonomy.
As the debate over the Rakhine Corridor intensifies, the Yunus-led interim government finds itself navigating treacherous political waters.
On one side lies the moral imperative to respond to an unfolding humanitarian disaster; on the other, the very real domestic risks associated with unilateral decision-making on matters of national interest.
ALSO READ: Can Bangladesh condemn India’s Waqf Bill while ignoring its own vested property act?
With rising tensions on both sides of the border, the Rakhine Corridor proposal may well become a defining flashpoint in Bangladesh’s current political transition—one that tests the limits of interim authority, public consensus, and geopolitical caution.
